

REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM) IN THE SOMALIA CRISIS

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Abstract

Since the Berlin conference of 1884/85 and the scramble for and partition of Africa, Africa has a protracted history of civil war as a result of poor leadership, political instability, and agitation for resource control. Primarily, the study examined the critical role of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Somalia crisis. The AMISON has helped the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) push the Al-Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out the Somalia capital, Mogadishu, and played a critical role in the formation of a legitimate government and the training of over 4000 Somalia Police Officers (SPL) in different categories of police work. The paper also looked at the AMISOM background, what gave rise to its formations and their mandate. The paper made use of the sociological theory of war as its theoretical framework. Of interest in this theory is Mead's dismissal of the notion that war is the inevitable consequence of our "basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature"; war, for Mead is rather situated within the nature of state. The paper concluded by noting that regional peace and security in Africa should be given top priority by African leaders as this drives development and innovation. The paper recommended that a political solution should be given to the crisis where all the warring parties come to the negotiation table; prompt and adequate payment of troops should be adhered to; and, finally, democracy in Africa should be consolidated for a responsible leadership with conscience.

Keywords: regional peace, security, Somalia crisis, AMISOM, peacekeeping

Introduction

War, according to Margaret Mead (1940), is an invention...not a biological necessity. Peace, also, is not the absence of violence in totality but the functioning of all the apparatus of governance with an end result of responsible leadership. In the words of Ban Ki-Moon, former Secretary-general of UN, "peace means access to education, health, essential services which ...must be nurtured through the dignity, rights and capacities of every man and woman". It is a wakeup call for nations to be on their feet to beef up security, since there is no peace without development and development is not durable without peace. Peace and security is an integral part of a society, as regional bodies and international organizations like United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are constantly involved in the promotion of peace and security.

The African Union has devised strategies for promoting peace, security and stability on the continent by focusing on measures that address issues like widespread poverty, youth unemployment, poor governance, illiteracy and lack of free and fair election, although with major focus on regional peacekeeping operations. AU has an active mission in Somalia called African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with approval from UN Security Council, with the mandate of ensuring free movement, safe passage and protection of all stakeholders involved in the peace process. These form the basis for this study. The central objective is to examine the critical role played by AMISOM in the Somalia Crisis, contributions of AMISOM in the Somalia crisis, taking into consideration the background of AMISOM, its mandate and brief history of Somali crisis. The paper sections include theoretical framework, conclusion and recommendations.

Brief History of Somalia Crisis

Etalong (2016) posited that Nigeria participation in the Africa Peacekeeping Initiative of Somalia is one of the achievements of Nigeria's foreign policy goals. In-depth analysis was given by Etalong on the Somalia Crisis. To avoid repetition few emphasis will be made here for reference purpose. The Somali civil war is an ongoing civil war taking place in Somalia. It grew out of the resistance to the Siad Barre government during the 1980s. According to *amisom-au.org* (2017), British Somaliland to the north gained independence on 26th June 1960, and the former Italian Somaliland followed suit five days later. On 1st July 1960, the two territories united to form the Somali Republic. A government was formed with Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President,

and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister, later to become President (from 1967-1969). On 20th July 1961 and through a popular referendum, the Somali people ratified a new constitution. In 1969, following the assassination of President Shermarke, a military government assumed power in a coup d'état. General Siad Barre became the President and was to rule Somalia until 1991, when he was ousted by combined northern and southern clan-based forces. These years of warfare among rival clans caused famine on a biblical scale as civilians died of starvation. As a violent power struggle developed between two warring clan lords, Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the former British Somaliland, comprising the northwestern section of the country, between Djibouti and the northeastern area known as Puntland, declared its independence. However, its sovereignty is not recognized by any nation or international organization. Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the most powerful of the warlords, ruled the capital Mogadishu; he seized international food shipments at the ports, using hunger as his weapon of warfare. Barre and his armed support remained in the south of the country until mid 1992, causing further instability.

Meanwhile, the fighting in Mogadishu devastated the city. All this disrupted agriculture and food distribution in southern Somalia, causing a famine and the deaths of approximately 3,000 people. The UN responded by authorizing a limited peacekeeping operation, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM's use of force was however limited to self-defense and it was soon disregarded by the warring factions. Faced with an impending humanitarian catastrophe, the United States organized a military coalition with the purpose of creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the conduct of humanitarian operations. This coalition (Unified Task Force, in brief, UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992, launching Operation Restore Hope, which was successful in restoring order and alleviating the famine. In May 1993, most of the United States troops withdrew and UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

Aidid saw UNOSOM II as a threat to his power, and his militia attacked UNOSOM troops. Fighting escalated until 19 American troops and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in a raid in Mogadishu in October 1993. The UN withdrew in March 1995, having suffered significant casualties, and with the rule of government still not restored. In August 1996, Aidid was killed in Mogadishu. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia is the most recent attempt to restore national institutions to Somalia. Established in 2004 and internationally recognized, its support in Somalia was resisted until the United States-backed 2006 intervention by

the Ethiopian military, which helped drive out the rival Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu and solidify the TGF's rule. Following their defeat, the ICU splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia.

In February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia's Transitory Federal Institutions (TFIS). The Security Council authorized the member states of African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013) until 30 November 2015, although the mandate was later extended. AMISOM supported the FGS' commitment to a credible electoral process in 2016 and is actively working closely with the FGS and SNA to bring peace and stability to the nation.

Theoretical Framework

Several theories exist in the arts/humanities and social sciences in justifying the causes of war and crime in the society. The psychological theorists are of the view that the aggressive nature of man is responsible for warfare in the society. They postulate that the subconscious mind of man is inanimate in nature while the sociologist theories, which form our theoretical framework, are of the view that the structure of the society is responsible for war. One of the theorists, Margaret Mead, proposed her theory of war in her 1940 essay which stipulates that "Warfare is only an invention...Not a Biological Necessity". She dismissed the notion that war is the inevitable consequence of our "basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature". She supported that, by the simple fact that not all societies wage war. War has never been observed among a Himalayan people called the Lepchas or among the Eskimos. In fact, neither of these groups, when questioned by early ethnographers, was even aware of the concept of war.

In discussing the Eskimos, Mead further distinguished between individual and group violence. Eskimos were "not a mild and meek people", she noted. They engaged in "fights, theft of wives, murder, cannibalism", often provoked by fear of starvation. "The personality necessary for war, the circumstances necessary to goad men to desperation are present, but there is no war". Those who argue for the first view endow man with such pugnacious instincts that some outlet in aggressive behavior is necessary if man is to reach full human stature. It was this point of view which lay the foundation for William James's essay "The moral Equivalent of War", in which he tried

to retain the warlike virtue and channel them in new directions. A similar point of view is seen in the Soviet Union's attempt to make competition between groups rather than between individuals. A basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature is assumed, and those who wish to outlaw competitiveness merely try to find expression. There are those who take the second view. Like Mead, warfare is the inevitable concomitant of the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources of class societies springing, not from the nature of man, but from the nature of history. War is nevertheless inevitable unless we change our social system and outlaw classes, the struggle for power, and possession; and in the event of our success warfare would disappear, as a symptom vanishes when the disease is cured.

One may hold a sort of compromise position between these two extremes; one may claim that all aggression springs from the frustration of man's biologically determined drives and that, since all forms of culture are frustrating, it is certain each new generation will be aggressive and aggression will find its natural and inevitable expression in race war, class war, nationalistic war, and so on. These three positions are very popular among those who think seriously about the problems of war and its possible prevention. However, another point of view, less defeatist perhaps than the first and third, and more accurate than the second is that warfare, by which is recognized conflict between two groups as groups, in which each group puts an army (even if the army is only fifteen pygmies) into the field to fight and kill, if possible, some of the members of the army of the other group—that warfare of this sort, is an invention. For example, clan rival between Barre government during the 1980s and the army of Mohammed Farrah Aidid, the invention of Aidid during this war was 'hunger'; he uses hunger as weapon of warfare by seizing international food shipments at the ports, to cut supplies to the government troops and the citizens. Another is in the area such as writing, marriage, cooking our food instead of eating it raw, trial by jury, or burial of the dead, and so on.

Going by this analogy so far, the Somali civil war is an invention as a result of the fragile nature of the state, agitation for resource control and governance among the rival ethnic clans (Somaliland, Puntland, and Islamic Court Union (ICU)) all fighting for the control of the central government and supremacy.

Background of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom)

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. According to *AMISOM official website amisom-au.org*, AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), peace support mission to Somalia or IGASOM which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006. IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council. Initially IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali civil war. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the radical group at the time, had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

As at May 2006, the situation was radically different. The ICU (Al-Shabaab) had engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the second battle of Mogadishu, known as 'the battle of supremacy'. By June, they had established control of the capital. Plans for IGASOM continued. By July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiatives as a US- backed, Western means to curb the growth of Islamic Movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006. The UN, as an indication of its commitment to world peace through its Security Council, authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744 (2007) 13, on the 20th February 2007. The aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and the UN requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations peacekeeping mission.

It became imperative as tension in Somalia grew tougher and innocent civilians losing their lives on a daily basis due to the activities of the Al-Shabaab. On October 2014, the Security Council (Resolution 2182, 2014) gave a green light to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30th November, 2015. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union Mission to take all measures, as appropriate to avoid violation of human right, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a

national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society. All this gave rise to the formation of AMISOM with the mission mandate of reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab. This mandate will be discussed in the next section in detail.

AMISOM Mandate

According to UN resolution of 2016 adopted at its 7731 meeting on 7th July 2016, the UN decided to authorize the member states of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31st May 2017. It further decides that AMISOM shall be authorized to take all necessary measure, in full compliance with the participating stated obligations under international humanitarian law and, in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial, political independence and unity of Somalia. AMISOM was thus authorized to implement the following strategic objectives:

1. Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.
2. Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilization efforts, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia.
3. Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces.
4. To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups.
5. To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM concept of operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces.
6. To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement.
7. To secure key supply routes including areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that, the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU.
8. To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS.
9. To contribute within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance.

10. To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilization by the United Nations country team and other actors.
11. To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government and security for key infrastructure.
12. To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the security council.
13. To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate and in coordination with the United Nations.

The United Nations security council have the exclusive right in determining the mandate of AMISOM, so far six resolutions have been passed on the mandate of AMISOM in Somalia namely: 2006-2007 mandate, Resolution 2010 (2011), Resolution 2073 (2012), Security council meeting of 7061 (2013), Resolution 2182 (2014) and security council meeting of 7731 (2016) been the latest resolution on AMISOM mandate.

The Operation of AMISOM

African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops are contributed by ten countries namely: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Niger and South Africa. The component currently has 386 police officers and is comprised of 103 Individual Police Officer (IPO) from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Niger. 280 formed police unit (FPU) from Nigeria and Uganda, and 3 senior leadership Team (SLT) officers from South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria. The component is headed by police commissioner, Anand Pillay while the AMISOM military is headed by Lt. Gen. Jonathan Rono (Amisom-au.org, 2017).

The AMISOM police are saddled with the responsibility of providing mentor and advisory support to SPF on basic police duties such as human rights observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing, search procedures and investigations. Sequel to this, Etalong (2015) noted that, AMISOM police provide VIP escorts, cooperate with the Somalia Police Force in many police stations as possible to promote intelligent information sharing. The AMISOM military on the other hand is

the biggest of the three components of the AU mission. They are mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seek to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. They also provide protection to the country's Federal institutions as they carry out their functions and help secure Somalia's key infrastructure including its airport and seaports.

As set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013), in line with the Security Council, the AMISOM are to maintain maximum level of 22,126 troops. The troops are drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed on six sectors covering south and central Somalia. Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, and lower Shabelle. Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 comprising lower and middle Jubba. Sector 3, comprising Bay and Bakol as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3), come under Ethiopian command. Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud while Burundian forces are in charge of Sector 5 which covers the middle Shabelle region.

The achievement of AMISOM through its police and military troops cannot be overstated as they have conducted training and refresher course for middle level officers, new recruits, as well as running courses in traffic management and criminal investigation techniques. Over 4000 Somali police officers have been trained in different categories of police work by AMISOM police and its partners. Between 2011 and 2014 AMISOM led offensive operation that drove Al-Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu and major territories controlled by them, forcing the Islamic radicals to operate from rural areas with little or no territories under its control.

In March 2007, the AMISOM military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National security forces push the Al-Quaeda- affiliated terror group, Al-Shabaab, out of much of southern Somali including most major towns and cities. It has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to establish accountable local governance institutions that can begin to deliver service as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government. Mogadishu today is transformed. The local economy is booming and the effects are far from confined to Mogadishu. Securing the capital allowed AMISOM to move into the second

phase of its original concept of operations, deploying across the country and expanding the authority of the state.

They made medical services available, by providing an in-patient medical services as well as a reliable supply of purified water. Etalong (2015) argued that all these have helped Somalia to begin a journey to political development and economic recovery. Examples: the biggest mother and child hospital in east and central Africa is to be opened in Mogadishu, Somalia capital. With the help of AMISOM, in 2016/2017, election was held in Somalia to form a formidable government. This election ushered in President Mohammed Abdullahi Famaajo, who promises to tackle insurgency in the country. The election is major breakthrough for Somalia and AMISOM as it is often talked about. According to SRCC Ambassador Maderia Caetano and the head of AMISOM, 'Somalia is destined for a brighter future, following the successful conclusion of its electoral process...it is confident that it has laid a strong foundation for democracy and better governance in Somalia!'

Even with these numerous achievements recorded, they are not left out without challenges. The mission is faced with several challenges ranging from poor welfare packages and delay in salary. The salary of these troops is seldom paid. Burundi threatening to withdraw their troops is due to poor welfare on the part of European Union who is a major donor and financier of AMISOM. As at December 2016, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza not only said he might withdraw the 5,000 Burundian troops in AMISOM but will also sue AU. By December 8 of that same year, he sent a formal letter to the AU commission stating that the continued non-payment of allowances to Burundian troops in AMISOM may lead to subsequent decision by the government, including the possibility of withdrawal. In his word "if the Burundian troops in Somalia are not paid until January 2017, they will immediately come back to their home country". This was resolved as Burundi contributed another troops on 25th August 2017. Paul (2017) noted that there have been argument and counter argument over the appropriate amount of money that should be provided to AMISOM troops as allowances. He further observed that these arguments intensified when from January 2016, the EU, which pays for all the allowance for AMISOM troops, reduces its payment by 20% from \$1,028 to \$822 per soldier, per month. This is not a welcome development as the troops may be further demoralized.

Achievements of AMISOM

AMISOM has primarily been acknowledged as having made some remarkable achievements. These achievements include:

1. AMISOM has achieved some peacekeeping success and has contributed to the stabilization of Somalia.
2. AMISOM has significantly contributed in bringing Somalia to where it is today and will continue to be of importance to the future of Somalia. For this reason, AMISOM has come to be seen by some observers as a blueprint for Africa solutions to African problem with African boot on the ground, supported by international resources.
3. The security achievement has provided the new government with the opportunity to extend its presence throughout the country leaving Somalia with the best opportunity to achieve sustainable peace and development that the country has not seen in a generation.
4. It also forces Al'shabab and NSF to abandon its control of Mogadishu in 2011 and the retaking of Kismayo by the Kenyan troop of AMISOM in 2012.

Conclusion

Based on the findings detailed in this research, it is clear that AMISOM has made an important and substantial contribution to improving the security situation in Somalia, particularly as it relates to the seizure of Mogadishu from alshabab in 2011. This turn of event was facilitated by several factors including the 2010 authorization of an increase in AMISOM troops which increased the manpower of the mission. Furthermore, the major internal changes to AMISOM which has enabled the mission to contribute to the improved security in Somalia has included changes in Amisom mandate, increasing the authorized troop level from an initial 8000 to 12000 and finally to 17,700. AMISOM mandate has also been revised to allow the mission to expand both geographically and in terms of scope, enabling a more offensive stance using all necessary means to defeat Alshabab.

The AMISOM mission in Somalia so far is commendable with their numerous achievements and contributions to the peace process in the troubled zone. Regional peace and security in Africa needs to be given adequate attention as development in the continent is non-negotiable, since there is no development without peace and development is not durable without peace. It is hoped that the political, social and economic engineering currently pursued by AMISOM and the administration of President Mohammed Abdullahi Famaajo will provide the irreversible turning point in

the peace process, national recovery, self-sufficiency in vital areas and above all durable, stable and development-oriented political system.

Recommendation

After careful appraisal of the role of AMISOM in Somalia and some of their challenges, this study suggests the following:

1. A political solution should be given to the current Somalia crisis, where all the warring parties will come to the negotiation table.
2. Adequate and prompt payment of troops should be a top priority among financing bodies to boost the morale of troops.
3. Countries should see the contribution of troops as a selfless sacrifice without any political gain or scoring of cheap political point.
4. Democracy in Africa should be consolidated for a responsible leadership with conscience.
5. External support should be provided to increase the capacity of AMISOM in terms of improving management, planning and training.
6. The U.N and E.U should increase their support for AMISOM to strengthen the mission on different levels.
7. Training and increase in manpower of the mission should also be provided.
8. Strategies for preventing dispute from escalating into conflict and for preventing the reoccurrence of conflict – preventive diplomacy and preventive disarmament which may take the form of mediation conciliation or negotiations – should be adopted.

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